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Theorizing Crime and Deviance is, as the subtitle suggests, an attempt to outline a new 
perspective in criminological theory. This new perspective makes no claims to be a ‘general 
theory’ or an ‘integrated theory’ of crime causation, if integration is defined as a broad 
synthesis of existing theories as the first move towards a unified theory. The aim is to lay 
some initial foundations on which an alternative theoretical framework with some 
explanatory power and developmental potential can be constructed. Whether it can be 
integrated with the mainstream canon remains to be seen. 
 
The book begins with the claim that post-war criminological theory on the left side of the 
political divide has been avoiding what should be criminology’s primary question: ‘why 
individuals or corporate bodies are willing to risk the infliction of harm on others in order to 
further their own instrumental or expressive interests’ (p.1). Criminologists on the 
conservative/classical liberal side of the political divide do not shirk this aetiological duty, 
but their general discourse suffers from four fatal flaws: firstly, they do not explore the 
ontological field of harm to challenge orthodox legal definitions of crime; secondly, they tend 
to ignore crimes of the powerful and instead focus disproportionately on crimes of the 
powerless; thirdly, they tend to use rather crude positivist methods and categories that cannot 
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capture the complexity of social life; fourthly, they regard human nature as prone to ‘evil’, 
which of course means that, rather conveniently, they don’t really need any aetiological 
theories of subjectivity over and above those concerned with the maintenance of discipline 
and socialisation. 
 
Left-wing (or ‘liberal’, in US parlance) criminology’s flight from aetiology has left it rather 
vulnerable to criticism. Its critics find it too easy to say, with some justification, that it cannot 
recognise or explain its own principal object, expressed as the primary question above. If it 
cannot answer this question, how can the population have any faith in its ability to lead 
society on a path away from the harms caused by crime and other corrupt practices? This 
inability also creates a huge vacuum into which right-wing intellectual and political 
contenders flow with glee, offering populist explanations and punitive solutions. Politically, 
left-liberal criminology shoots itself in the foot with its own constant vacillation around its 
primary object. When crime rates increased in 1960s and 1970s despite increases in freedom 
and affluence and the (albeit temporary) truncation of social inequality, which refuted the 
liberal left’s principle explanations of relative deprivation and repression, criminology 
entered what Jock Young called its ‘aetiological crisis’. There appeared to be a pressing need 
to return to the questions of causality and motivation. However, the liberal left, which still 
retains the annoying habit of sneering at the very idea of causality as an affront to its 
deconstructive sophistication, was not up to the job.  
 
This palpable failure allowed US and British right realists to lever themselves back into 
criminology’s intellectual driving seat in the 1980s to join right-wing economists in the 
corridors of power. Right realism supplied neoliberal governments with intellectual support 
for the massive incarceration and private/public securitisation programme that remains with 
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us today, and which must be considered as one of the main reasons behind the recent 
statistical ‘crime decline’. The right won the day, and part of the reason why was that the left 
had quit, at least on the aetiological battlefield. Thus the right can continue to advance their 
favourite primary causes of personal choice, evil individuals and irresponsible parenting 
because the liberal left, running scared of aetiology and fixated on problems of linguistic 
definition and the attenuation of social reaction, have few if any roadworthy alternatives. 
Given this rather abject state of affairs, the book goes on to argue that left-liberal 
criminology, now in danger of political marginalisation except as the voice of conscience in 
the criminal justice system, must make a decisive comeback on the aetiological battlefield.  
 
The book moves on to claim that criminology must transcend interpretive relativism and the 
notion that cultural pluralism is the natural ‘bedrock’ of societies and revisit the ontological 
question of consensual harms. The argument revolves around the possibility that a consensual 
core of harms is surrounded by a contested periphery, and criminology must begin to focus 
most of its analytical energies on the core. In order to move this debate forward, it’s 
necessary to revive the philosophical principle of universalism, and, whilst making 
concessions to the existence of a relativistic periphery, begin once again to posit harm as a 
universal ontological category. This is not a plea to return to absolute authority, but, having 
said that, we must also understand that the absolute sovereignty of the interpretive ego 
presents us with a problem of the same magnitude at the other end of the scale. The tyranny 
of absolute authority and the debilitating chaos of absolute interpretive relativism must both 
be transcended.  
 
We do not have a ready-made consensual understanding of harm, but this must be the 
purpose of future debate, and this debate must be brought to the centre of criminological 
4 
 
education, criminological research and governmental policy to replace the now rather tedious 
mantra that all categories of crime are ‘contested’. This might well be the case, strictly 
speaking, but core categories need objective decisions on whether they are harmful, which 
should then lead back to the aetiological debate. 
 
The first step for criminology is to move away temporarily from legal definitions of crime to 
a debate on harm, sometimes called a ‘zemiological’ debate. This will not be easy. At the 
British Society of Criminology conference in 2013, a year after the book’s publication, a 
mock jury voted against this move, which indicates that British criminology is happy where it 
is, uninterested in contextualised aetiology and dominated by criminal justice studies and the 
annoying tendency to dismiss most representations of crime as ‘moral panics’. This 
reluctance is an impediment to the development of the discipline. The book argues that 
criminology might consider restarting a serious debate around a simple principle: 
 
[What] is harmful to human beings and their multi-layered life-supporting 
environments should be criminalised. Where harm is considered to be less serious on 
a consensual scale, it should be subjected to initially condemnatory yet eventually 
restorative social pressure, or, where it is very slight, possibly ignored (p.5/6) 
 
The establishment and constant maintenance of the demarcation line between the core and 
periphery is important. Even postmodernists and other relativists and constructivists admit the 
existence of the core of consensual harms, but they tend to insist on a small core of ‘brutal 
violence’. This definition is too restrictive, and it is accompanied by a reluctance to open up a 
debate and place that debate at the centre of the discipline’s research and education 
programmes. This reluctance is the result of liberalism’s all-encompassing fear of the 
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oppressive state, and the concern that any expansion of the category of consensual harm will 
justify the equivalent expansion of modes of ‘governmentality’. This book argues that 
criminology should not be governed by anyone’s irrational fear – conservatives’ fear of the 
working class, liberals’ fear of the state, or whatever – and it is not right to attempt to close 
the debate like this; not right for the integrity of the criminological discipline and not right for 
future generations who might want the chance to make their own decisions in the 
circumstances in which they find themselves. Harm cannot simply be defined by the more 
brutal acts of physical violence. It is a far more expansive category that encapsulates an array 
of acts and their experiential consequences.  
 
The book moves on to investigate what underlies this avoidance of the important discussion 
of core harms, and the tendency to shrink the core to a minimum, and it concludes that the 
problem is post-war political catastrophism. We still live our lives in the fearful shadow of 
Stalinism and Nazism, the horrific results of Agamben’s ‘state of exception’, which invoked 
the politics of fear to pathologise specific cultural groups and scare the population into 
thinking that drastic political action and the suspension of human rights were necessary to 
purify the social body and place a firm authoritarian political hand on the helm of economy 
and culture. This historical nadir haunts the liberal imagination to the extent that it tried to 
dismantle politics per se. To a large extent it succeeded in its mission, and we live today in 
the midst of post-politics, a self-induced political paralysis.  
 
However, the legitimate and totally comprehensible attempt to consign Nazism, Stalinism 
and other brutal forms of totalitarian governance to the past was over-extended. It also 
destroyed the credibility of the social-democratic regulatory framework and allowed the 
libertarian anarcho-capitalist right to return to the centre of politics and culture, to complete 
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the destructive job, crush conservatism, socialism and social democracy, and release the 
forces of the market. The result is that we now confront a world of totalitarian neoliberalism, 
controlled by a corporate oligarchy and beset by increasing social inequality, jobless growth, 
the marginalisation of youth, urban slums, ethnic tensions and the normalisation of global 
criminal markets. We also face the possibility of the return of reactionary protectionism and 
nationalism and an upsurge of racism. The only solution at hand is the security state, 
precisely what liberals did not want. With no alternative politics to offer, we have all bought 
into the ‘end of history’ discourse. The only recourse is to humanise the criminal justice 
system as it stands and lobby for its downsizing, which further reduces left liberalism’s 
credibility amongst an anxious population whose anxiety is not simply the product of 
government and media scaremongering but the very real position of socioeconomic and 
geopolitical precariousness in which they find themselves.  
 
In this climate of political catastrophism aetiology is downplayed and customised to fit the 
solution on offer, the downsized and humanized criminal justice system. This means that the 
approved solution is defining the problem, an inversion of what criminology should be. This 
should not continue to displace and marginalise honest and penetrative debate on aetiology, 
the results of which might suggest that political intervention of a different nature is required 
at the other end of the process, i.e. the criminogenic conditions of late modernity. However, 
strict ideological policing of criminology, assiduously maintained because criminology exists 
on the forefront of ethical condemnation, has ensured that only carefully selected 
philosophical concepts and social scientific theories have been allowed into criminology’s 
mainstream debating chamber. Where we seek integrated theory, which is noble cause, we 
are forced to draw from a pre-restricted group of concepts and frameworks. 
 
7 
 
We should reopen the debate on harm, revive our aetiological curiosity and bring it back to 
the centre of criminology. Where law should be defined by harm, at the moment harm is 
defined by law, with all the concessions to political power that this idealist inversion of 
reality demands. The book tries to examine what underpins this inversion, and concludes that 
the dominance of hard-line social constructionism and relativism has created a climate of 
symbolic inefficiency, which now pervades not just criminology and social science but 
politics and popular culture. Following the likes of Derrida and the cult of deconstruction, we 
have reached a stage in our politico-cultural history where meaning can be established only 
for the length of time it takes to deconstruct and destroy it. The liberal left has embraced 
endless dissidence and contestation with no political purpose in mind other than the 
permanent suspension of real interventionist politics. Attempts to construct symbolically 
efficient concepts of harm with a view to political regulatory action are met with endless 
scepticism, automatically accused of being constructed in exaggerated forms to create ‘moral 
panics’ and justify expanded modes of ‘governmentality’. Radical liberal anti-statism 
dominates left-wing criminology, but out there in the real world the whole project has 
backfired as socioeconomic life becomes ever more precarious and the security state grows in 
the absence of alternative forms of democratic political intervention.  
 
In the absence of serious debate the neoliberal elite, who suffer from no such relativistic 
doubts, can retain its grip on the concept of harm and define it in its own terms, which usually 
involves the disproportionate blaming of the powerless. Criminology does offer a tradition of 
critique aimed at state and corporate harms, but it consistently fails to deal with the 
individuals and forms of subjectivity behind these harms. As a first move towards the analysis 
of harmful subjectivity, the book moves on to introduce the notion of special liberty to the 
criminological debate, a traditional liberal-capitalist cultural norm that allows the business 
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class to justify the harms they inflict on human beings and their environments in the name of 
prosperity. However, this mentality is not restricted to a ‘structural’ class. The book claims 
that the norm of special liberty pervades British and US culture. Legitimate and illegitimate 
markets have expanded since deindustrialisation, and the anti-social and anti-human ethos of 
special liberty, the permission to risk inflicting harm on others to simply ‘get things done’ to 
satisfy the demands of business in a competitive environment, can be found in everyday 
operation throughout the social structure, from corporate boardrooms to ghettoes.  
 
The avoidance of the question of harm and the disavowal of its everyday consequential 
presence permeates the social structure, imposing a silence across the political spectrum and 
threatening the reproduction of universal empathy in social life. It is difficult to drag harm 
back to the centre of a criminological discipline that tends to disavow the concept from two 
opposed political positions – the right don’t want their harmful practices exposed whilst the 
liberal left don’t want to expand modes of ‘governmentality’. Criminology must prise itself 
out of this double-edged intellectual embargo. Harms are diverse, but this is precisely why we 
need more ontological cohesion and consensus. They occur not just in the dimension of basic 
human physicality – in other words ‘person and property’ – but also the environmental, 
financial/economic, social, cultural, emotional and psychological dimensions.  
 
At this point the book argues that we must revisit the basic Hegelian proposition of social 
recognition as the category that grounds and unifies the notion of harm, whilst still 
recognising its formal diversity. Recognising the rights and empathising with the emotions 
and basic needs of others is the basis of this position. Needs are multi-dimensional, but they 
can be boiled down to material survival, love, rights and esteem. This is accepted by many 
criminologists. However, the original Hegelian formulation is obsolete because the current 
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social order has severed the socioeconomic interdependency on which Hegel’s concept was 
based. In a period of automated production and dominant finance where the return on capital 
now exceeds the rate of growth expressed in output and wages, the global ruling class simply 
does not need the services of an increasing number of working people. Many ‘slaves’ are 
technically redundant, and the master is no longer forced to recognise the slave or seek the 
slave’s consent, and no longer susceptible to the slave’s judgement, which was the source of 
the slave’s latent political power. The master is now blessed with arbitrary choice, a matter of 
‘charity’, which means that the master is now capable of narcissistic self-affirmation, and the 
arbitrary choice of whether or not to grant recognition becomes the most important aspect of 
special liberty. The dialectic is suspended: as the relation of interdependency unravels and the 
gargantuan security state enforces pacification it is no longer strictly necessary for the elite to 
respond to the harms and underlying injustices declared by the subjugated. Those who argue 
for the return of social recognition as the basis for a universal category of harm have assumed 
an already existing democracy. This inverts the causal relation; in fact democracy would be 
the result of the prior acknowledgement of harm and the embrace of empathy and social 
recognition, and would allow their institutionalisation as the foundation for renewed politics 
and the realization of progress. Thus criminology’s move towards a universal category of 
harm would be a very important intellectual building block in the renewal of democratic 
politics. 
 
However, the book takes this argument further by claiming that harm is not an aberration, a 
category that can be used to define occasional deleterious consequences caused by the 
capitalist system’s frequent malfunctions or an individual’s action permitted by the refusal to 
recognise the rights of the other. These are harm’s manifest forms, but this book’s main claim 
is that harm in its hidden forms is integrated in the actual core of the capitalist system, and its 
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attendant mainstream culture and subjectivity, as a functional dynamic force. Capitalism has 
not been a civilizing process across its history, but a pseudo-pacification process. The rest of 
the book describes and explains this process and the phenomenon of integrated functional 
harm. 
 
The discussion begins with a brief historical analysis of how the manifest forms and practices 
of harm have changed markedly across the course of modernity in the West. The brigandage 
and rule by physical violence that had become normalised in Europe after the fall of the 
Roman Empire declined. A fundamental paradox was recognised in England after the 
Norman invasion: because a market economy cannot function in a situation where property 
rights are unable to be protected, violent disorder hampered early capitalist economic 
development, but so did the opposite, too much ethico-legal regulation, altruism and 
sociability. Early capitalists taking advantage of the Norman’s lax estate management to 
enclose land and produce for the market sought a ‘third space’ of ‘orderly disorder’, a 
political and ethico-legal system that would reduce physical violence yet simultaneously 
bypass traditional ethics and foster aggressive sociosymbolic competition and exploitative 
business practices.  
 
The English murder rate began its long decline in the late 14th century. The nascent 
bourgeoisie lobbied hard to establish a pseudo-pacified culture that encouraged aggressive 
business and sociosymbolic competition signified by gentrification and conspicuous 
consumption, yet simultaneously repressed the more brutal forms of physical violence in all 
public dimensions. The rest of Europe adopted similar practices at various points around the 
16th century, reducing rates of murder and violence, which allowed the market economy to 
expand. The USA experienced a period of condensed change from the 18th century, but it 
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struggled somewhat with the conversion of physical aggression into sublimated 
sociosymbolic aggression. Murder rates declined, but undulated quite markedly and failed to 
reach the extreme lows experienced in Europe. 
 
Norbert Elias was right that physical violence was monopolised by the state in order to create 
a pacified space for the development of social interdependencies and behavioural codes, but 
he neglected the other side of the equation, the fostering of sublimated aggression in business 
and social life. Western populations were recruited en masse into the pseudo-pacification 
process. There was no disciplinary regime of ‘biopower’ bearing down on the population, but 
a system of regulatory practices maintained by the population itself as it began to understand 
the benefits of allowing aggressive sociosymbolic competition to be practiced at its limits to 
increase economic dynamism. This sublimated aggression, structured by a selective mode of 
social recognition and its refusal, fed into gentrification and consumerism, the cultural fuel 
required for economic development. The population’s recognition of the value of law and 
order was not just about personal security but prosperity and economic development. 
 
Cultural life was highly individualised in England from the 12th century. Whereas the laws of 
primogeniture and entail applied only to the feudal elite in Europe, in England they were 
introduced throughout the social structure. All but the eldest sibling were effectively 
dispossessed and encouraged to establish businesses outside of familial and communal 
territory. This effectively caused the breakdown of the family/community as a geographically 
bound economic and protective unit, dispersing insecure but inescapably ambitious 
individuals into the market economy in a process rather like cell-splitting, a sort of 
socioeconomic tumour. 
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The rise of markets and business as the principle means of livelihood, and the concomitant 
rise of conspicuous consumption as the mainstream cultural form anchoring social 
signification in the economy, coincided with the decline of rates of murder and serious 
violence. However, these developments also coincided with a concomitant rise in property 
crimes, fraud and other forms of non-violent illegality. As the English population became 
richer it became less egalitarian and honourable. Ethical values were displaced from the 
centre of socioeconomic life to the periphery, to act as ascetic restraining mechanisms for the 
sublimated vices – greed, usury, exploitation, deception, sociosymbolic aggression and 
abandonment of social recognition – that had been ushered to the centre as dynamic forces. 
The majority of individuals were physically pacified, but not for the sake of civilised values, 
rather to allow greater scope for their active participation in aggressive yet non-violent 
sociosymbolic competition, which of course was highly functional to the expansion and 
development of the market economy. This, in very simplified terms, is the basic anatomy of 
the pseudo-pacification process. The book explores its details and complications. 
 
This process did not reduce crime in general, but reduced murder and violent crime whilst 
creating an environment in which non-violent crime proliferated. The process calls for a 
conception of modernist culture and subjectivity as dualistic, motivated at its core by 
systematically cultivated yet ideologically disavowed aggressive drives – to use Slavoj 
Žižek’s term, the ‘obscene Real’ – but guided and restrained by pseudo-pacified behavioural 
codes. Codes should ideally be internalised by socialisation, but this is unreliable because 
codes are designed not only to repress or eliminate but also to stimulate and convert 
aggressive drives, therefore, because of constant overspill, they need to be backed up by an 
expansive external system of regulation and control. This coincides with the decline of the 
ethico-political desires and transcendental ideals that motivate the citizen, the active social 
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subject. Pacification and sociability, and indeed political participation, become overly 
dependent of the constant satisfaction of sublimated yet still aggressive drives to achieve a 
constant stream of little victories in the economically grounded sociosymbolic competition. 
Beginning in England and diffusing throughout the West, capitalist-modernity has largely 
been about the functional conversion of harms, which reinforces the need for a renewed 
debate on harm 
 
Having established the pseudo-pacification process as its analytical platform, the book moves 
on to explore the diffusion of the capitalist market economy, with its attendant cultural and 
subjective forms, across the contemporary globe. Everywhere the market economy is 
displacing traditional economic and cultural systems. Throughout the history of the pseudo-
pacification process the elite learned one vital lesson: the capitalist market economy is unable 
to thrive under conditions of either violence or altruism. The violence that thrives in the 
absence of altruism can manifest itself as either the barbarism of disorder or the barbarism of 
order. The system must constantly recreate a third space constituted by repressing both. 
Therefore, when collective forms that demonstrated propensities for either violence or 
altruism became institutionalised and politicised in the West, such as the Labour movement 
and the social democratic state apparatus, they were systematically disrupted in order to 
return society to the preferred condition of atomised competition. As neoliberalism took hold 
in the 1980s and populations found it far more difficult to participate in sublimated 
socioeconomic competition, there were huge crime explosions in Britain and the USA, but 
less so in Europe, which hung on to its social democratic apparatus. 
 
The book discusses the complex cultural and subjective manifestations of the pseudo-
pacification process and the functional role and various formal manifestations of criminal 
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markets as they shadowed economic development in the West. The US and British 
experience is now being exported to other countries as global neoliberalism diffuses the 
pseudo-pacification process across the world. The freeing up of finance capital, neoliberal 
restructuring and cultural homogenisation is polarising socioeconomic inequality worldwide. 
Neoliberalism is also encouraging the displacement of traditional cultures and their political 
traditions with the depoliticising form of consumer culture. This, together with technological 
developments in communications and transport, has created conditions conducive to the 
development of global criminal markets and de-territorialised criminal networks. The gradual 
rejection of politics and solidarity has coincided with an increasing attraction to detachment, 
mobility, personal enrichment and special liberty in the global economy. Offshoring and the 
emergence of deregulated paraspaces offer opportunities for unrestricted commercial activity, 
much of it criminal in a global economy where the line between legal and illegal activity has 
become increasingly blurred.  
 
Rapid large-scale urbanisation processes and the decline of subsistence agriculture have 
created glocal nodes for expansive criminal markets. Youth unemployment and the migration 
of anxious young people into legal and illegal markets as all-purpose opportunists have 
fuelled criminal dynamism. Illegal trafficking in drugs, weapons, alcohol, cigarettes, money 
and people, combined with the rapid expansion of cyber-crime, has created a class division in 
the criminal economy based on differentials in multi-purpose skills. Crime decline statistics 
have become increasingly misleading as these developing forms of crime mutate beyond the 
reach of police and standard crime surveys. At the top of the social structure, corporate crime, 
fraud, state crime, political corruption and illegal invasions constitute a grim picture for the 
21st century. It seems that the social democratic period was little more than a brief period of 
respite, and we have now returned to the legal and illegal adventuring that was inextricably 
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intertwined with early capitalist development. Such a proliferation of harms is difficult to 
calibrate, but the core social harm caused by neoliberalism and neglected by criminology is 
the destruction of stable socioeconomic systems and the consequent inability of so many 
working people to earn a living without compromising their values and risking prosecution. 
 
The book criticises criminology’s neglect of these epochal criminogenic shifts in political 
economy and culture and continues with a trawl through a number of dominant philosophical 
positions and social theories, most of which deny formative connections between subjectivity 
and the socioeconomic system. The verdict is that, in the context of recent developments in 
the real and intellectual worlds, criminological theory is way off the pace. Powerful elements 
within the mainstream criminological hierarchy seem to demand that important and relevant 
new theories should not be taken seriously, and that revealing empirical work into the 
criminogenic conditions of late capitalism should be discouraged. Criminology seems to be 
content to remain an importer discipline, overly dependent on liberal philosophy and 
sociology for its core ideas. Throughout the discipline’s developmental history many 
traditional philosophical positions have been rejected rather than incorporated and 
synthesised, and we are now left with a narrow debate between conservatism/classical 
liberalism and radical liberalism/social liberalism. The only aetiological concession made 
was to feminism and its forthright analyses of harms in the gender order. The book discusses 
the narrowing down of the criminological debate and identifies a major problem in the 
discipline’s canon: criminology has no conception of the dark side of liberal individualism 
and seems to be resistant to dualistic theories of the human condition, which are quite 
deliberately misrecognised and rejected as ‘conservative’, the very theories we need to 
integrate into criminological theory in the current era.  
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Other problems are identified and discussed. Anti-essentialism and anti-reductionism are now 
blanket bans in social theory. Of course we need to avoid stereotyping cultural groups and 
individuals, but in our analysis of systems we can no longer talk about underlying principles. 
Capitalism itself becomes ineluctably ‘plural’, a multiform product of cultural value systems 
that pre-exist it and can change it. Therefore deindustrialisation, narcissism, competitive 
individualism, depoliticisation and so on can no longer be put forward as conditional, 
probabilistic causes of crime. Everything is mediated by cultural systems and susceptible to 
the choices made by the autonomous sovereign ego, therefore even complex concatenations 
of causes and probabilistic conditions are out of bounds. Some extreme forms of 
postmodernism have rejected the very ideas of crime, harm and their causes. Everything is 
contingent, relative, open to unlimited interpretation, and radical indeterminacy rules, not as a 
political possibility and a conduit for real change, but as the only a priori ontological 
certainty. The book goes on to discover how criminology’s aetiological crisis discussed 
earlier is actually self-imposed, and in many quarters celebrated. The liberal social scientific 
establishment prefers us to think only of human agency shaping institutions – what might be 
behind this agency, and why it never seems to be able to unseat concentrated power, is never 
to be discussed. Depth and causality are dehumanising. Only totalising ideologies, external to 
the subject, are bad things – the system is guilty, the individual is innocent. 
 
The Anglo-American social scientific establishment, when it is not conservative, is 
dominated by the cults of Weberianism, creative interpretivism and methodological 
individualism. Continental philosophy, critical realism, critical theory and psychoanalysis, for 
instance, have never been fully accepted and integrated. It seems that we can play active 
piecemeal roles in changing the system for the good, but we can never have a role in its 
badness. The terrible things it does have nothing to do with us. There are no drives, desires or 
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deep structural forces connecting individual subjects to the system. This is the 
institutionalisation of what Slavoj Žižek calls fetishistic disavowal, and presents us with 
liberalism’s benign, innocent individual, a simplistic inversion of conservatism’s wicked, 
fallen individual. Both ends of the analytical spectrum have been blocked off. There is no 
way out to any place beyond, and any movement towards either end risks being denounced as 
either a liberal or a conservative. Attempts to transcend this duality are marginalised. Social 
science in general and criminology in particular cannot progress in this restrictive furrow. 
 
This demarcation appears as the main fault line in the history of criminological theory. The 
major shift occurred in the Chicago School in the 1930s. Marx’s ideologically duped social 
being and Durkheim’s bearer of pathogenic anomie were replaced by liberal progressivism’s 
insistence that the ‘deviant’ should be appreciated as autonomous, pragmatic and creative, 
adapting to difficult circumstances. The idea that we create and reproduce these difficult 
circumstances ourselves was marginalised – perish the thought, we resist in an inexhaustibly 
creative mode. The ethical individual should never be seen as a cog in the system or a 
wretched creature driven by unconscious forces and licentious desires. Marxism and 
Freudianism were pushed out of the picture, although later humanised versions were 
reluctantly allowed back in on condition they get back into liberalism’s line and behave 
themselves. Western philosophy and social science entered a mode where both liberals and 
conservatives attacked any formulation that posited the individual as a bearer of the harmful 
drives and desires needed to reproduce the system – liberals because the innocent individual 
should not be disparaged and reduced as the system’s reproductive agent, and conservatives 
because, given the individual’s inherent wickedness, there’s nothing much wrong with the 
system anyway. The political desires to conserve and replace the system, both thought to be 
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dangerous and oppressive, were replaced by a great faith in the inherently ethical individual’s 
ability to gradually reconstitute and reform society’s institutions. 
 
Non-conservative social and criminological theory was forced into the ethical and pragmatic 
centre-ground. The world was to be explained solely in these terms and nothing else, and 
criminology’s different schools are variations of that master discourse. The permitted solution 
was granted the sole right to define the problem. The shape of criminological theory’s canon 
across the 20th century, which the book outlines in Chapter 4, is a gradual convergence 
towards the narrow centrist, pragmatic position made possible by the careful selection and 
modification of social and psychological theories that support that movement and the 
rejection of those that suggest alternative ways of thinking. Deep ontological and political 
differences were cast aside to allow room only for epistemological variations of liberalism’s 
ontological certainty. 
 
The reality, that the majority of individuals were forsaking both ethics and politically 
rebellious urges in order to adapt as efficiently as possible to capitalism’s brutal competitive 
individualist culture and save themselves from poverty and humiliation – and of course to 
reap rewards as wages increased and business opportunities burgeoned in periods of 
economic boom – was either marginalised or rejected outright. Ethical realism and its politics 
were abandoned in favour of pure pragmatism and the multiple gestures of ethical idealism. 
To sustain this intellectual and political project it was necessary to abandon all conceptions of 
dialectics, ideology and unconscious drives and any connection they may have to each other. 
The mainstream canon of social and criminological theory duly obliged.  
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However, the book argues that this paradigm of thought is rapidly running out of steam in the 
21st century. The abandonment of the alternative theories and categories mentioned above, 
and outlined in more detail in the book, prevents the construction of criminological theories 
based on dialectical contradictions, powerful drives and desires and ideological incorporation 
into the capitalist system and its attendant culture. The rest of Chapter 4, which will be of 
most use to undergraduate criminological students, points out the flaws in each major 20th 
century criminological theory, and how these flaws culminated in the sort of overall 
theoretical weakness that contributed to the downfall of relatively successful social 
democratic politics and the return of new right thinking in the 1980s. At this point in time 
mainstream liberal-left criminology had shifted from aetiology, the study of the multiple 
causes and probabilistic conditions that underlie crime and harm, to ‘controlology’, the study 
of the control system with a view to downsizing it and ensuring the humane treatment of 
offenders. Deep political intervention in underlying socioeconomic causes and conditions – 
which some thinkers such as Elliott Currie have argued is the most effective and enduring 
way to downsize the system – was to be taken off the agenda, and there was no better way of 
achieving this aim than denying their existence. Traditional politics was replaced by identity 
politics, with the aim of addressing unequal relations across the lines of ethnicity, sexuality 
and gender within the market economy and the class structure as they stood. Only critical 
criminology, cultural criminology and left realism carried forward some tentative notions of 
deep socioeconomic causes and conditionality. Unfortunately, however, left realism was 
incorporated by the Blair and Clinton governments, and both critical criminology and cultural 
criminology tended to retain romanticised ideas of inexhaustible cultural forms of political 
resistance that, by the turn of the millennium, in reality had virtually disappeared. Bringing 
back genuine political opposition to the fore of everyday life is today’s most pressing 
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problem, but nothing hampers the solution more than the assumption that it is already in 
place. 
 
The second part of the book, Chapters 6 to 9, points out the main flaws in liberal thinking and 
presents alternative ideas – either resurrected from obscurity and modified to suit current 
circumstances or currently in the throes of intellectual development – that could, with a little 
bit of effort and determination, be used to construct an alternative perspective on crime and 
harm. It suggests that many of the conceptual mainstays of post-war liberal theory, such as 
‘biopower’, ‘moral panic’ and ‘the culture of control’, are not only outdated but fundamental 
category errors. Their continued existence is a product of a long-running fear of the state and 
collective authority, which leads to misinterpretation and overstatement. For instance, 
although the mass media do obviously exaggerate the harm that street crime causes, the 
purpose is not to cause a ‘panic’ and justify further authoritarian governance. Crime fiction 
and news reporting always finish with solutions to crimes that are portrayed as 
individualistic, and these solutions are always provided by the extant criminal justice system. 
This fosters a sentiment of complacency, not panic, amongst Western populations whose 
members on the whole have never been more depoliticised and apathetic. The criminal justice 
system has been expanded in a surreptitious way to cope with real problems caused by 
neoliberal disruption – for instance the expansion of drug markets and the decline of mental 
health services – not amidst a huge fanfare created on the back of public fear. Progressive 
socialist and social democratic political movements of the past achieved relatively impressive 
results despite right-wing media’s constant dispensation of crude ideology, because they had 
inner strength and conviction and mass support. The current liberal left is blaming its own 
failure of nerve, weakness of thought and failure to inspire the population on a right-wing 
mass media that has existed since the 19th century. 
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Jean Baudrillard – yet another continental theorist neglected by Anglo-American criminology 
– once argued that if ‘disciplinary biopower’ and all the other figments of the fearful liberal 
imagination did exist, there would be something to resist, and people, left to their own 
devices and acting on their own clear thinking, would probably resist them. What exists, 
however, above all else, is Debord’s ‘society of the spectacle’, a seductive simulacrum that 
absorbs human energies and manipulates desires. Our fixation on ‘governmentality’ and so 
on has distracted our attention from the concentrated oligarchic power at the top of capitalist 
system – which, along with its huge pots of offshore assets, appeared in stark relief during the 
financial crisis of 2008 and showed itself to be the uppermost layer of concentrated 
socioeconomic power that government merely serves – and the deep drives and desires that 
motivate individual action in late-modern consumer societies. Liberal societies dare not look 
up, and they dare not look down. Foucault’s notion that ‘power is everywhere’, and the new 
left’s notion that ‘politics is everywhere’, are dependent on the redefinition of both categories 
to the extent that they cease to have any substantive meaning. This is how the liberal left 
dissolved itself in the throes of political catastrophism, and the book discusses in detail why 
these positions and others like them need to be rejected and replaced. 
 
The rest of the book outlines what needs to be put in place to produce a new criminological 
perspective with explanatory power. Liberalism has no positive conception of harm as drive, 
only as temporary consequential aberration. It is beset by a constant fear of the natural, that 
which threatens to overwhelm the autonomous ethical individual and destroy the fragile 
cultural superstructure on which civilization depends. We cannot allow this institutionalised 
fear to restrict criminological enquiry. For the individual, the aggressive/defensive harmful 
drive is energised by a lack of trust in others, the product of abuse and neglect by parents, the 
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very people on whom the young child depends. Death drive was for Freud our bestial nature 
activated as will in trying circumstances. To extend this principle to the social world we must 
return to the issue of social recognition. Capitalist culture and dominant subjectivity is the 
same condition and relation writ large, the inability to trust others in a ruthlessly competitive 
society. We no longer trust politicians, police officers, media people, business executives or 
any of today’s ‘leaders’, or in some cases even our workmates and neighbours. They appear 
before us as scoundrels, out for their own profit and gratification – Berlusconi, Sarkozy, 
Blair, Clinton and Bush represent the political norm. We live in an era of cynicism, post-
politics and symbolic inefficiency, where there is no institutionalised ethical antidote to the 
obscene pursuit of gratification in which we see our erstwhile leaders indulge every day. 
Alongside their multi-dimensional philandering they appear incapable of guardianship, of 
performing their allotted roles and looking after the interests of a mass of underemployed 
workers whose lives are becoming ever more precarious as the global capitalist system seeks 
new levels of ‘efficiency’ in its pursuit of profit. 
 
In such cynical times, too many individuals fall back on the obscene Real, internalised 
consumerist envy and exploitation, disavowed and experienced privately as enjoyment, which 
energises the capitalist project. Why shouldn’t they? Their leaders of left and right have told 
them that no feasible alternative socioeconomic system is possible and they allow themselves 
to be revealed every day with their snouts in the trough. Rather than fall back on ethico-social 
values, economic criminals seem to follow society’s fallen leaders in short-circuiting the 
norms and rules that keep obscene drives in check. This creates the doubling of humiliation, 
the most common psychological harm inflicted on the population by criminals, who gratify 
their obscene desires without having to suffer the mundane labour and exploitation that fill up 
the lives of everyday people. By obeying the cultural norm and making important 
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contributions to the reproduction of the ideology that disavows these obscene drives, by 
refusing them a place in their analyses, liberal criminological theorists cannot connect agency 
to structure or explain the ubiquitous motivations behind most forms of crime. On the other 
hand, conservatives posit these drives as ‘timeless’ and ‘natural’, which, as the book goes on 
to explain, they are most certainly not. 
 
The book moves on to frame this problem in a dialectical tension that seems impervious to 
whatever interpretive autonomy we have left. The social disruption caused by the neoliberal 
right’s economic policies creates the conditions for expanding criminals markets and 
increases in crime rates, whilst the liberal left’s public denial that a distinctly different 
socioeconomic system is possible destroys the alternative ethico-political narrative – now 
displaced by identity politics – that throughout the era of high capitalism gave working 
people hope and another way of thinking about the world. This once active dialectical tension 
has now been attenuated and run down. Large numbers fall back on the obscene Real and 
pursue their own interests in competition with others, using criminal methods where 
opportunities present themselves or their inability to compete legally effectively gives them 
little chance of success. Only the massive security system in combination with strongly 
socialised beliefs in the authority of law and the fairness of the system deters greater numbers 
from gratifying the obscene Real in whatever ways are available. 
 
In the current left-liberal narrative, the polarised struggle between the exploited and exploiter 
class has been replaced by the undialectical tension between the corporate state and the 
individual or various identity groups. The discussion of dialectics in Chapter 7 is complex, 
but the upshot is that the abandonment of the social dialectic has destroyed both self-
recognition amongst the exploited and recognition of the exploited by the exploiters, and vice 
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versa. The majority no longer recognise each other through the lens of class, and, even where 
the ruling class do they don’t reveal their knowledge too much in public. This multiple denial 
of recognition dissolves collective social conflict to intensify and reproduce the competition 
between ‘equivalent’ individuals, who have little support and nobody to blame but 
themselves should they fail, and obviates all popular conceptions of socioeconomic life as a 
system of relations. In the absence of any substantial collective identity, libidinal energy can 
be stimulated amongst envious, anxious and depoliticised individuals, and harnessed via 
consumerism’s sociosymbolic competition to the economic system. 
 
Having established the importance of the suspension of dialectical conflict and explained why 
dialectical thinking should return in intellectual life, the final two chapters explain how the 
West’s historical capitalist system has temporarily captured the individualised subject of its 
ideology and how this subject is simultaneously stimulated and pacified in a specific way that 
fuels consumer culture and economic expansion. This explanation involves a reassessment of 
biology mediated by culture and ideology in a framework provided by the new philosophy of 
transcendental materialism. This is complex and explained in detail in the book, but the 
upshot is that human drives are not hard-wired mechanistic ‘instincts’ attuned to survival and 
triggered by various environmental phenomena. The latest neuroscience suggests that an 
array of sophisticated emotions form an interface between weak instincts and the cultural 
world of symbols. Only the terror of extreme abuse in early childhood is etched firmly in the 
neurological system. This explains the motivations behind a very small amount of extreme 
violent crime, but not the often more successful and rewarding crime committed by those 
who have not experienced such extreme terror.  
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Where some family regimes are extremely brutal, the majority are merely tough, and many 
combine tough discipline with care. This is preparation for life in capitalism’s competitive 
individualist system. Capitalism seeks tough individual competitors willing to play by the 
rules. Here we can see a scalar and formal conception of harm and subjectivity: the ideal 
capitalist subject is willing to do harm to others in pursuit of self-interest, but the scale and 
form of action and harm varies considerably. We can neither romanticise nor pathologise this 
ideal subject, but see him or her on a scale of dissociation, a form of being that seeks to by-
pass social language and morality to simply act in ways driven by its proto-symbolic 
emotional condition. Referring back to the beginning of the book, this is a personalised state 
of exception where the individual grants itself special liberty to act in his own interests or 
gratify her own hatred and prejudice. The scale can range from extreme, compulsive and 
dysfunctional – such as the serial killer or rapist – to the mild, controllable and functional – 
such as the fraudster or economic criminal, depending on the intensity of the trauma and 
dissociation and the degree to which conformity to external rules is inculcated by 
socialisation. 
 
This scalar rather than qualitative difference in fundamental motivation means that a ‘normal’ 
political and cultural analogue further down the scale from the extremely traumatised, 
dissociated individual can exist. Functionally ruthless individual ‘undertakers’ in crucial 
positions are willing to take the lead in disregarding others in order to ‘get things done’: 
 
At specific points when the system demands the sort of excess of exploitation and 
destruction that it periodically requires, the conformist individual, whose occupational 
position in the system can range from the corporate apparatchik to the fraudulent or 
violent economic criminal, must momentarily show unflinching allegiance to 
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whatever practical manifestation of these logical demands presents itself as necessary. 
When morally offended onlookers respond with the rhetorical question “is this really 
necessary?” the active conformist has already decided that it is (p. 200)  
 
What separates the ruthless criminal undertaker (‘undertaker’ is used in the sense of an 
individual who ‘undertakes’ to get things done even though it could inflict harm on others) 
from the mainstream ruthless undertaker is little more than a willingness to conform to the 
system’s rules. The core drive, the obscene Real that has displaced internalised ethical values 
as motivations, is shared. Ruthless undertakers operate throughout the social structure, from 
ghettoes to boardrooms and governments. Liberal capitalism has never been about ‘freeing’ 
or ‘controlling’ subjects, but energising key subjects with ruthless and asocial forms of 
ambition, rewarding them and fostering envy in others. Only the alternative fostering of 
genuinely civilized emotions can lead to a better world – many would already agree with that 
– but the conundrum is that these emotions would be dysfunctional in the competitive 
environment reproduced by aggressive and pseudo-pacified drives. 
 
The core of the human neurological system is shot through with conflicting drives, therefore 
the human being has weak ‘instincts’. This means that the human being is malleable at the 
material level, hard-wired but only, paradoxically, for plasticity, which has been necessary 
for survival in multiple and changing environments. This inverts the orthodox liberal view – 
in actuality it is the material body that is malleable whilst symbolic systems induce rigidity 
and inflexibility because that is their primary social and practical function. Pre-symbolic life 
is terrifying for the helpless child, therefore de-naturalising ourselves to create subjects of 
language and seek a symbolic order also inhabited by others is entirely natural. This process 
is the formation of what we call subjectivity.  
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The problem, however, is what Adrian Johnston calls deaptation, where the symbolic system 
or ideology becomes actively counter-productive in a new environment. Ideologies tend to 
insulate themselves from major shifts in natural and socioeconomic environments. This 
insulation is maintained by the powerful conformist subjects who benefit most from the 
ideology’s continuation. Over long periods of time dominant ideologies become seriously 
deaptive because they consist of layers of previous maladaptations caused by resistance to 
change. However, on its own, constant dissent is counter-productive. Anxious individuals 
cannot tolerate life without a comprehensible ideology shared by others, they crave a unary 
order. Identity actively solicited by the fearful individual and provided by entrance into the 
symbolic order is returned inwards and consolidated in the body’s neurological circuits. To 
change itself, its emotional being and its dreams and desires, the individual subject must re-
enter an alternative order of symbols, an ideology more suited to the current environment, 
which must have time to cultivate the intermediary realm of proto-symbolic emotions, to 
which drives can be recruited to form desires that are connected to external symbols. There is 
no ‘autonomous’ or ‘determined’ subject, only a subject that seeks a collective symbolic 
order in which he or she can become individuated; the choice between symbolic orders is the 
only choice available. 
 
Modernity’s political unary orders – socialism and social democracy – are disintegrating with 
no replacement in sight, whereas liberalism does not exist as a unary order, only a ‘clearing 
house’ for plural cultures in a market economy. Violent criminality and tribalism grow in 
spaces where once unary symbolic orders are in constant disarray. We can see this in today’s 
violent paraspaces in failed states, and we can see it bubbling up in disrupted former 
agricultural communities or communist states, and in deindustrialised and economically 
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abandoned areas of the post-political era. We can also see it in the cut and thrust of global 
geopolitics and business competition. Only appeals to tolerance and constantly increasing 
levels of material wealth combined with tight securitisation and the rule of law together 
prevent further violence. 
 
Neoliberalism, together with its classical liberal antecedents, is a historical exception. It does 
not try to create solidarity and security, whereas other systems were failed attempts to do so 
over long periods of time. To promote aggressive individualised competition it systematically 
cultivates the anxiety of the subject who permanently lacks a unary order. It is uniquely 
criminogenic, although not necessarily violent in its everyday life. The book finishes with a 
return to the concept of pseudo-pacification and further develops the explanation of how the 
capitalist system and its attendant consumer culture cultivated and sublimated anxiety to 
foster a culture of competitive individualism. This was not an attempt to adapt to a new 
environment, but to create, expand and reproduce a new environment driven forward by: 
 
[An] economically functional dualistic form characterized by the dynamic tension 
between overstimulated libidinal energy and tenuously internalized sublimating and 
pacifying codes backed up by external systems of control (p.218) 
 
The very basic psychosocial processes in the pseudo-pacification process are the stimulation, 
democratisation and capture of the obscene Real. This has a complex cultural history, which 
the book explores in detail, beginning in England, diffusing outwards through Europe and the 
USA and now displacing unique historical cultures elsewhere as neoliberalism goes global. 
The pseudo-pacification process is a psychosocial energy generator. Capitalism’s original 
Promethean dream was not to construct an ideology and logic of practice appropriate to the 
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environment and principles of social justice, but to transcend environmental restrictions, 
disintegrate and atomise social orders, create unlimited wealth and democratise opportunities 
for self-aggrandizement: the ultimate and permanent ‘escape from evil’ in the individual’s 
imagination. Therefore the system was fundamentally deaptive from its beginning, fuelled by 
the seductive and exciting dream of constantly going beyond limits. It could be described as a 
form of managed deaptation. For those fully recruited, pacification became dependent on 
constantly increasing wealth and circulating the commodities and competitive opportunities 
for social status in which identity is forged. The system is criminogenic at its root, but, 
paradoxically, also pacifying in the sense that violent crime was largely displaced by more 
subtly harmful practices. 
 
The systematic disintegration of family and community created the permanently anxious 
hyper-individualised subject, which was forced to cope with permanent insecurity as 
subsistence was also removed. Yet, the same subject was attracted to the seductive 
compensation of expansive opportunities for wealth and sociosymbolic status, which were of 
course unavailable to the majority in the rigid social hierarchies of the past. The pursuit of the 
abstract values of money and the democratised signifiers of social status replaced the 
traditional defence of land, family and bodily honour. The traditional community and ‘moral 
economy’ in their various cultural forms were replaced by a hastily assembled superstructure 
of fake benevolentism and sentimentalism. The idea of ‘common fate’ was eventually 
rejected as individuals began to regard themselves and their own enrichment as life’s 
fundamental purpose. This new cultural goal permeated art and literature throughout Early 
Modernity in Britain and Europe, which became vehicles for the creative expression of 
private dreams and life-projects, tinted in the background with the acknowledgement of vital 
behavioural codes and a melancholic nostalgia for the ‘lost object’ of community.  
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The pseudo-pacification process’s fundamental psychosocial drive is provided by the 
sublimation of the once ubiquitous physical aggression that ordered Feudal societies, and its 
subsequent conversion into sociosymbolic competition ordered by the signifiers of consumer 
culture. The decline of physical violence and the subsequent rise of property crime and fraud, 
fuelled by the ubiquitous pursuit of money and status symbols, effected a major historical 
shift in the dominant form of crime: from the ‘somewhere’ of land, community, family and 
body to the ‘nowhere’ of the abstract economy. The absence of organic trust in others became 
normalised, externalised and displaced by private contracts and currency. Therefore basic 
security is transferred from family/community and located exclusively in the capitalist 
economy, and the ‘social contract’ is displaced from the centre of society to the periphery, a 
mere boundary restricting excessive anti-social activity. Traditional sources of identity were 
replaced by identification with consumer signifiers, which normalised and diffused a taste for 
luxury and aristophilia that is now manifested by the population’s fascination with wealth 
and celebrity culture.  
 
The pseudo-pacification process was quite effective as a means of combining pacification 
with aggressive competition to promote prosperity. The problem is that it is fragile and 
criminogenic, a poor substitute for a genuine civilized culture. It is prone to breakdown in 
spaces where opportunities diminish and the rule of law is relatively lax, or in spaces in the 
top social echelons where the gratification of the obscene Real can be concealed from public 
scrutiny. Pacification is contingent and over-reliant on the constant gratification of new 
desires and the expansion of economic freedom and prosperity, which are in turn reliant on 
constant economic growth. There were brief periods of genuine solidarity in some proletarian 
communities during the industrial heyday, but they largely disintegrated in 1980s. 
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In the current conjuncture characterised by automated production, resource depletion, climate 
change, slow economic growth and consumer saturation, the ideology behind the pseudo-
pacification process is becoming truly outdated and dysfunctional. We must suspect that the 
ability to keep crime and harm in check is over-reliant on the expansion of both the external 
control system and the virtual means of gratifying consumer desires. However, there are signs 
that some young people are seeking a new ideology beyond left-liberalism’s diluted post-
political form of constant aimless dissent, a truly adaptive symbolic order beyond the pseudo-
pacification process. Others, the majority, less attuned to the hazardous nature of our current 
situation, suffer from depressive hedonia and remain restless, nihilistic and frustrated, 
seeking temporary respite as commodities are virtualised and become very cheap or free, and, 
in the most impoverished locales, become prone to drift into criminality. Perhaps the way 
forward is to relax the pressure, to stop stoking anxiety in the individual’s psyche, which 
would result in less disappointment and frustration, less crime, a return to the principles of 
citizenship and democratic politics and a diminished need for control. It is difficult to tell. 
The book offers no concrete solutions, but simply requests that criminology join the 
important debate. 
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